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ADOPTION OF THE BA YH-DOLE ACT IN 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: ADDED PRESSURE FOR 
A BROAD RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 
Michael S. Mireles· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous developed countries, most if not all members of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD), including Japan, France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Finland, have 
or are considering adopting legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act. 1 These countries 
apparently believe that passage of legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act will lead 
to the transfer of government funded research results from the university laboratory to 
the marketplace and other economic activity. In the United States, the birthplace of the 
Bayh-Dole Act (the Act), it is not entirely clear whether its passage is the direct result 
or sole cause of the increase in patenting and licensing occurring after its passage. 
Much of this university patenting and licensing has been in the biotechnology field. 
Some commentators believe that the purported positive consequence of the 
Act-increased patenting and licensing-would have occurred without the Act. While 
it is not entirely clear whether increased university patenting and licensing would have 
happened anyway, the Act does attempt to encourage technology transfer through 
several means. First, the Act provides an incentive structure to encourage participants 
in the technology transfer process-researchers, their employers, and potential 
licensees-to attempt to bring technology to market. The primary incentive to 
commercialize an invention is the ability of recipients of government funding for 
research to take title to patentable inventions resulting from that research. The 
exclusive rights provided by the patent allow the owner or licensor of that patent to 
possibly extract a supra-competitive price for the patented invention in the market. 
Second, the Act also provides a uniform government policy concerning the treatment 
of government funded inventions, which reduces transaction costs in obtaining 
ownership to government funded inventions. Third, the Act provides a strong signal 
to universities to patent and license government funded inventions. Finally, the Act 
places patenting costs with the entity in the best position to bear those costs-the 
university or private company-instead of the inventor. 
• Assistant Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. The author would like to thank 
Christine Galbraith for her kind invitation to participate in the University of Maine's Closing in on Open 
Science Symposium. The author is also grateful for the support of the editorial staff of the University of 
Maine Law Review, especially Heather Sanborn. The author greatly appreciates the research assistance of 
Diane Burkhardt, Caryl Shipley, Ryan Fletcher, Evan Aspinwall, Dan Christopherson, and Mia Felder. 
I. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of I 980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 
Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)). 
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Some critics of the Act argue that it upsets the production and dissemination of 
scientific knowledge, particularly basic science, by the academic enterprise. Instead 
of academia serving as an independent arbiter of science, governed by Merton's norms 
and thus encouraged to spread knowledge widely for the public benefit, the Act has 
resulted in a divergence of research agendas from basic to applied science, conflicts 
of interest, increased secrecy amongst academic researchers, and a withholding of 
research materials or data. The Act is also criticized for requiring the public to pay 
twice for an invention: once by funding the invention through taxes, and again, by 
extracting a supra-competitive price in the market through patents. Also, the Act 
arguably reduces the amount of information directed to the public domain-the 
foundation of new innovation-and the consequential spillover ofbenefits by allowing 
the patenting of government funded inventions. Perhaps the most frequently raised 
criticism of the Act is that it is contributing to the development of a tragedy of the 
anti commons in biotechnology innovation. A tragedy of the anti commons occurs when 
too many property rights are granted in one particular piece of property, with the result 
that the holders of the rights are unable to transfer and aggregate those rights to use the 
property. There is currently conflicting empirical evidence on whether an 
anticommons has emerged in the biotechnology field in the United States. 
This essay makes several points. First, the Bayh-Dole Act may not be successful 
in Europe and Japan-success judged by increased patenting and licensing-because 
of the differences in the history, practice, and structure of most European and Japanese 
university systems compared with the U.S. university system. It may take substantial 
change in the practice and structure of European and Japanese university systems for 
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act to be successful. While European and 
Japanese university systems appear to be undergoing that change, it will likely take a 
substantial amount of time to modify long-standing practices and existing structure. 
Second, assuming legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act is successful in Europe 
and Japan, it may make the development of an anti commons more likely in the United 
States because of increased patenting and licensing by European and Japanese research 
universities and spin-off companies in the biotechnology field in the United States. 
Finally, while an anticommons may be avoided in European countries and Japan, as 
those countries generally have a more robust research exemption to patent 
infringement, the increased patenting and licensing in the United States may result in 
an anti commons because of the limited common law research exemption. This may 
result in pressure for the United States to enact or develop, through the common law, 
a more robust exception similar to that of other developed countries. 
Part II of this essay discusses the Bayh-Dole Act. Part III analyzes the adoption 
oflegislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act in European countries and Japan. Part IV 
reviews the anticommons theory as applied to biotechnology innovation, and Part V 
analyzes the pressure for a more robust experimental use exception in the United 
States. The last section offers some concluding thoughts. 
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II. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act represented a change in federal policy 
concerning the ownership of government funded patentable inventions. 2 Prior to 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, each federal agency and funding group had its 
own policy concerning whether a funding recipient could take title to an invention 
developed from that funding.3 Generally, the policies of those funding groups either 
required the government to retain title or dedicate the results of federally funded 
research to the public domain. Instead of favoring ownership in the government or 
dedication of the invention to the public domain, the Bayh-Dole Act creates a uniform 
federal policy that favors the patenting of government funded invention and the 
ownership of those inventions by the recipient of federal funding. The grant of title 
purportedly provides the recipient with the necessary incentive to invest in the 
commercialization of the invention. 
There are numerous arguments and supposed benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act; 
however, there are also a number of criticisms. 4 The primary argument in support of 
2. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (l 996). ALINE C. FLOWER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 12 (BNA 2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 20l(b)) (''The 
Bayh-Dole Act generally applies to all 'funding agreements,' which are defined as government contracts, 
grants, and cooperative agreements ... 'for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research 
work."'). Further, 
[t]he Act applies to "subject inventions," which are broadly defined as "any invention of the 
contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under 
a funding agreement .... " The term "invention" is further defined as "any invention or 
discovery which is or may be patentable or otherwise protectable under" federal patent law. 
Thus, the Act applies to invention and discoveries that can be patented, even if the 
contractor is not inclined to apply for a patent. 
Id. at 15 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 20l(e)). The scope of the Act is thus quite broad. For example, "[a]n 
invention can be a 'subject invention' if the government spends little on its conception while the contractor 
pays entirely for its further development, including its reduction to practice" and "an invention can be a 
'subject invention' when conceived by a contractor working with its own funds, but reduced to practice 
under a government funding agreement." Id. at 16. Thus, "the making of a simple note in a laboratory 
notebook while working under a funding agreement could be considered the conception ofan invention to 
which the government would have rights, even if the invention was not further researched or developed 
during the term of the agreement." Id. 
3. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663. 
4. The eight purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act are expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 200: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to [ l] promote the 
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; [2] to 
encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research 
and development efforts; [3] to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities; [ 4] to ensure that inventions made by 
nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; [ 5] 
to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United 
States by United States industry and labor; [ 6] to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and 
[7] protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and [8] to minimize 
the costs of administering policies in this area. 
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). Recipients of federal funding who may receive ownership of the federally funded 
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the Bayh-Dole Act is that private industry requires patents on government funded 
inventions to justify the expenditure of resources to develop such an invention into a 
commercial application. 5 Before enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, a substantial 
amount of research results funded by the federal government and subsequently 
patented were not licensed. 6 However, this group of patents covering government 
funded research results was subject to a selection bias. 7 Most of these patents covered 
inventions wherein the contractors were usually permitted to take title to those patents. 8 
Thus, this group of patents had been rejected by private industry, and it should 
therefore not be surprising that other industry participants would also not want to 
obtain title to those patents. 9 
Another justification for the Act was a belief that companies based outside of the 
United States were benefiting from the results of the research funded by the U.S. 
government. 10 Policy makers also believed that the Bayh-Dole Act would 
"reinvigorate U.S. industry by giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas that would 
enhance productivity and create new jobs."" One of the benefits of the Act was the 
creation of a uniform policy concerning ownership of government funded inventions, 
invention include small businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities. See The University 
and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Cong. I (I 979) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); id. at 33 
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). See also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 8-12 (discussing legislative history 
of Bayh-Dole Act); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded 
Inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 393, 447-48 (2006)(discussing legislative 
history ofBayh-Dole Act). The Bayh-Dole Act also specifies the conditions under which federal agencies 
may apply for, obtain, and maintain patents, and license government funded innovation. 35 U.S.C. §§ 207-
09. See also UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: QUESTIONS ANO ANSWERS, COUNCIL ON 
GoVERNMENT AL RELATIONS I ( 1996), [hereinafter COUNCIL ON GoVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,] available 
at http:/1206.151.87 .67 /docs/bayhdoleqa.htrn ("Enactment of Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517) ... on 
December 12, 1980, created a uniform patent policy among the many federal agencies that fund research. 
Bayh-Dole enables small businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities, to retain title to 
materials and products they invent under federal funding."). By executive order and later congressional 
housekeeping legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act was extended to not only small businesses, but to all 
government contractors, including large businesses. See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 
10, 1987). 
5. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1669-70. 
6. COUNCIL ON GoVERNMENT AL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at I. The motivation for passing the bill 
was stated as follows: 
Id. 
One major impetus for the bill was the lack of a capability on the part of the federal 
government to transfer technologies for which it had assumed ownership. Hundreds of 
valuable patents were sitting unused on the shelfbecause the Government, which sponsored 
the research that led to the discovery, lacked the resources and links with industry needed 
for development and marketing of the inventions. Yet the government was unwilling to 
grant licenses to the private sector. The few federal agencies that could grant patent title to 
universities, were overregulated with conflicting licensing and patenting policies. 
Technology transfer under those conditions was operationally prohibitive for universities 
and made them reluctant to enter the technology area. 
7. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1702. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1703. 
10. Id. at 1665. 
11. Id. at 1664-65. 
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which simplified the technology transfer process. Another related benefit is that the 
Act cleared bureaucratic hurdles that existed prior to passage of the Act. Notably, the 
discussion concerning passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was silent regarding the impact 
of the Act on university contribution to innovation through academic presentations, 
academic publications, and the training of future industry workers. 12 
In achieving the broad purposes of commercialization and technology transfer 
from the laboratory to the market through the grant of title, the Act provides incentives 
to the parties involved in bringing technology to market. Those parties include the 
government, the public, the inventor of the technology, the employer of the inventor, 
follow-on innovators, and entities involved in the commercialization of the invention. 
Instead of providing ownership initially to the inventor, the Act provides ownership to 
the entity that is most likely to be able to bear the costs of patent prosecution: the 
university or other grant recipient. The transfer of technology often occurs between 
universities, recipients of government funding, and private industry. 
Since the passage of the Act, there has been a dramatic increase in the patenting 
and licensing of government funded inventions by universities or other nonprofits, and 
the creation of other apparently related economic activity. 13 In 1980, fewer than 250 
patents were issued to universities; in 2004, over 3,800 U.S. patents were issued to 
universities. 14 More than 3, I 00 new products have been brought to market based on 
university or nonprofit research since 1998.15 Further, more than 4,500 companies 
have been created based on licenses from universities and nonprofits since passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act, 16 and close to 200,000 U.S. residents are employed in the 
biotechnology field.17 Also, "[b]etween 1991 and 1999, annual invention disclosures 
by university researchers increased 63% ... , patent filings increased 77% ... and new 
licenses/options increased 129%." 18 
Some commentators argue that the increase in patenting and licensing attributed 
to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act would have occurred regardless. 19 These 
commentators point to an upswing in patenting by universities prior to the passage of 
12. David C. Mowery & Shaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry 
Technology Transfer: A Mode/for Other OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 119 (2005). 
13. See AsSOClA TION OF UNNERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 
2004, at 2-3, available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf. 
14. Id. at i. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: REFORM WITH A 
PURPOSE 11 (2002), available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/secy_rept/contents.htm. 
19. DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVENN. SAMPAT & ARVIDS A. ZIEDONIS, IVORY 
TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT I (2004). See also Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University 
Licensing under Bayh-Dole: What are the Issues and Evidence,? 8 (2003), 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papersffhursby.pdf. ("Does university licensing under Bayh-Dole satisfy the 
Act's intent? While it is unclear what might have transpired in the absence of the Bayh-Dole Act, it is clear 
that the Act has at least facilitated technology transfer from universities."); cf Rebecca Henderson, Adam 
B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis 
of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REV. OF ECON. &STAT. 119, 126 (1998)("Clearly, the Bayh-Dole 
Act has been a success with respect to the second of these incentive effects. Both the rate of patenting and 
the extent oflicensing have increased dramatically."). 
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the Act because of advances in life sciences research, the change in the legal treatment 
of the patentability ofliving organisms in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty2° decision, and 
the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.21 The commentators 
further argue that, "[ c ]urrent research thus provides mixed support at best for a central 
assumption of the Bayh-Dole Act, i.e., the argument that patenting and licensing are 
necessary for the transfer and commercial development of university inventions." 22 
Moreover, the Act is subject to criticism by many commentators because it arguably 
causes a shift in the research agendas of scientists from basic to applied science, 
requires the public to pay twice for an invention, contributes to the development of an 
anticommons, results in increased withholding ofresearch materials and results, adds 
to increased conflicts of interest among academic researchers, and the provisions 
designed to protect the interests of the public have not been exercised as perhaps 
expected. 23 
III. COPYING THE BA YH-DOLE ACT IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The purported success of the Bayh-Dole Act-an increase in patenting and 
licensing activity by universities along with other economic effects-has led other 
countries to adopt or consider adopting legislative schemes similar to the Bayh-Dole 
Act.24 Some of these countries are members of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation Development. 25 For example, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Finland have adopted or 
are considering enacting legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act.26 However, there 
is a substantial question as to whether similar legislation will have the same impact in 
the OECD countries as the Act arguably has had in the United States: increased 
patenting and licensing leading to increased economic benefits such as new companies 
and jobs. 
In a recent article, Professors David Mowery and Bhaven Sampat argued that 
"efforts at 'emulation' of the Bayh-Dole policy elsewhere in the OECD are likely to 
have modest success at best without greater attention to the underlying structural 
differences among the higher education systems of these nations." 27 In the United 
States, before passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, there was a history of collaboration 
20. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
21. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 2. 
22. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 122. 
23. See, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, States as Innovation Systems Laboratories: California, Patents, and 
Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. I 133 (2006). 
24. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 115. 
25. Ken Howard, Global Biotech Expansion Taking Cues from Bayh-Dole, 22 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 919 (2004). 
26. Id. Australia is another country examining its innovation policy. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE lsSUES PAPER, at i (Feb. 2004), 
http://www.acip.gov.au/library/patentsexpuse.PDF [hereinafter PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE ISSUES 
PAPER]. This paper points out that "Australia spends, through public and private sources, considerable 
funds on research and development, including bio-medical research. There has also been increasing 
concern that there has been insufficient return on this investment through commercialization of research 
and development in Australia and that inadequate use of the patent system may play a part in this." Id. 
27. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 116. 
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between universities and industry, including technology transfer. 28 The historical link 
between universities and industry in Europe has been more attenuated than in the 
United States.29 Moreover, the structure and scale of the U.S. university system is very 
different from that of most OECD countries and these different characteristics 
encouraged university and industry collaboration. 3° For example, the U.S. university 
system is very large, includes "a very heterogeneous collection of institutions, ... 
lack[ s] any centralized national administrative control, and encourage[ s] considerable 
interinstitutional competition for students, faculty, resources, and prestige." 31 Before 
the Bayh-Dole Act, U.S. universities were reliant on local sources for political and 
financial support, which led to increased collaboration between researchers and 
industry. 32 Further, U.S. universities increased their patenting and some universities 
created technology transfer offices or hired technology transfer officers during the 
1970s, prior to the passage of the Act.33 
Professor Mowery has also argued that there must exist "a demand for industry for 
transfer as well as the processes to facilitate the transfer." 34 He and other 
commentators argue that a combination of features in the United States enable the 
transfer to happen, including: "venture capital, labor mobility between university and 
industry, large scale public funding for biomedical research, competition between 
universities for faculty and research money, lack of central government control and 
administrative autonomy of universities in addition to a comprehensive patent 
system." 35 Professors Mowery and Sampat have discussed the differences between the 
approaches of several countries in adopting parts of the Bayh-Dole Act.36 For 
28. Id. 
29. Y annis Caloghirou, Aggelos Tsakanikas & Nicholas S. Vonortas, University-Industry Cooperation 
in the Context of the European Framework Programmes, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 153, 153 (2001). 
30. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 116. 
31. Id. at 118. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 119. 
34. Howard, supra note 25, at 919. 
35. Id. at 920. Some authors have also specifically discussed the various differences between the U.S. 
and Japanese systems concerning "higher education and research funding, the venture-capital and IPO 
markets, cultural characteristics and incentive systems which impact scientists' entrepreneurialism, and tort-
liability exposures." See Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Star Scientists, Institutions, and the Entry 
of Japanese Biotechnology Enterprises (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5795, J 996). 
An issue concerning the differences between U.S., European, and Japanese markets may be "that Japanese 
pharmaceutical companies tend to do more in-house basic research and to a lesser extent rely on alliances 
with biotechnology companies or universities" than their European and U.S. counterparts. ANNA S. 
NILSSON, HENRIK FRIDEN & SYLVIA SCHWAAG SERGER, SWEDISH INST. FOR GROWTH POLICY STUDIES, 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED ST ATES, JAPAN, AND 
CHINA 27 (2006), http://www.itps.se/ Archive/Documents/Swedish/ Publikationer/Rapporter/ Allm%C3% 
A4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf. This may be because of "organizational and operational 
structures within companies [ and] restructuring of domestic pharmaceutical companies may lead to more 
interaction with universities." Id. Another commentator raises issues concerning whether European 
researchers are more risk adverse than U.S. researchers in commercializing their inventions because of the 
small number of positions in European universities, and whether there is a greater incentive in the United 
States to commercialize certain inventions because of the lack of price controls on prescription drugs than 
in many European countries where those price controls exist. Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global 
Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 209,218 (2004). 
36. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123. Universities in Europe may be more involved in 
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example, some countries have allowed public research institutions such as universities 
to take title to government funded inventions instead of the inventors. 37 This is 
different from the U.S. experience with the Bayh-Dole Act, which moved the ability 
to take title from the government to universities, not from inventors to universities. 38 
The granting of title to universities creates an obligation to disclose potentially 
patentable inventions to the university, allowing them the decision to patent and, more 
importantly, provides title to an entity with the motivation and ability to pay patent 
prosecution costs. The individual university inventor is unlikely to have the ability to 
front substantial patent prosecution costs. Professor Mowery and others have argued, 
however, that much of the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act, such as patenting and licensing, 
would have occurred without its passage. 39 
Professors Mowery and Sampat qualify their argument by stating that there may 
be some "modest success at best. "40 This "modest success" may be increased patenting 
and licensing activity by universities. Moreover, the authors state that there must be 
more attention to the underlying university structural differences between the United 
States and other OECD countries. 41 Members of the European Union and Japan have 
reformed or are currently reforming their university educational system and in some 
ways the reform appears to attempt to emulate the U.S. university system. For 
example, in Japan, the national universities, which received over three quarters of 
funding for basic research in Japan, have been converted into an independent 
administrative entity, called national university corporations. 42 Apparently, most of the 
results ofresearch at the national universities prior to the change to national university 
corporations could be used by private firms "for free or a small amount of donation 
paid to individual researchers for their inventions." 43 University corporations are now 
patenting than indicated by some studies. See Bart Verspagen, University Research, Intellectual Property 
Rights and European Innovation Systems, 20 J. ECON. SURV. 607, 628 (2006) ("[T)he data suggest that 
European universities are already more heavily engaged in patenting than was believed on the basis of 
official patent statistics."). 
37. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123. 
38. Id. For a discussion of how some OECD countries are reforming their legal treatment concerning 
government funded invention, see OECD, TURNING SCIENCE INTO BUSINESS: PATENTING AND LICENSING 
AT PUBLIC RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS 95-291 (2003) [hereinafter TURNING SCIENCE INTO BUSINESS]. 
39. Howard, supra note 25, at 990. 
40. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123. 
41. Id. 
42. Masuyuki Nishijima, Effects of the Anticommons on R&D: The Case of University Corporation 
in Japan 22-2 SETO, KANAZAWA-KU 3 (2004), available at http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.2724. 
I 080643531.pdf; see also Tabata Hirokuni, The Incorporation and Economic Structural Reform of Japan's 
National Universities, 8 Soc. SCI. JAPAN J. 91 (2005) (discussing the reform of national universities in 
Japan by the National University Corporations Law which converts national universities into corporate 
bodies); Fifth Report to Leaders on US-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 14 
(June 29, 2006), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/report0606.pdf ("Japan is preparing to submit 
legislation to the Diet in FY2007. This legislation will expand the scope of Japan's Bayh-Dole system, 
making it possible for contractors to possess ownership rights to intellectual property created through 
government-sponsored development of information systems, including software."); Ashley J. Stevens & 
John Fraser, Understanding thelmportanceofBayh-Dole, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006, 
at 37 ("In Japan, the government is privatizing the entire university system in part because they want 
Japanese universities to become economic catalysts, like their U.S. counterparts."). 
43. Nishijima, supra note 42, at 3. 
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allowed to earn income from the inventions their researchers develop and their funding 
is no longer guaranteed. 44 Moreover, university corporations are encouraged "to obtain 
patents of their inventions and engage in cooperative research activities with private 
firms." 45 This change also allows the national university corporations "to claim the 
rights to all inventions made by their employees. "46 The Japanese approach apparently 
attempts to create incentives for university corporations to generate income from 
patents. 
The European Union has also been active in reforming its university system. The 
European Commission recently released a report entitled, "European Universities: 
Enhancing Europe's Research Base." 47 Notably, the report expressly states that 
"autonomy is a good orienting principle because there is no single model for the 
European University, just as there is no model for the American University [and t]he 
Forum believes that Universities should be given more freedom to respond to changes 
that are occurring ... .'"'8 The report includes several recommendations for European 
universities, including encouraging mobility of trained people between universities and 
industry; "build[ing] up concrete synergies between universities and surrounding 
society ( companies, chambers of commerce, public authorities, etc.);" encouraging a 
"trans-disciplinary" approach to solving "scientific problems and those faced by 
society;" 49 encouraging universities to ''take a leading role in regional and local 
development;" and improving their ability to raise funding to carry out research. 50 
These recommendations appear to orient European universities to focus on solving 
44. Id; see also Flower, supra note 2, at 400 n.5 ("University researchers can now hold a concurrent 
post in the private sector, because civil service regulations no longer apply to universities."). 
45. Nishijima, supra note 42, at 3; see also Flower, supra note 2, at 401 ("Currently, under Japanese 
Patent Law Section 35, national university corporations can acquire ownership ofall work-related employee 
inventions."); Robert Kneller, University-Industry Cooperation and Technology Transfer in Japan 
Compared with the United States: Another Reason for Japan's Economic Malaise?, 24 U. PA. J. lNT'L 
ECON. L. 329 (2003) (discussing ownership rules concerning government funded inventions prior to 
formation of national university corporations, and the changes and impact of new ownership rules). 
46. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 26. Japan did enact the Industrial Vitalization Law, also called 
the Japanese Bayh-Dole Act, in 1999. Id. This law allowed the public research institution to own IP 
resulting from some government funding. Id. it did not apply to situations involving basic funding to the 
university professor and thus, in those circumstances, the university professor was entitled to retain title to 
those inventions. Id. Apparently, this situation Jed to possible under-reporting of inventions because "the 
researcher [had] to determine which results came from commissioned funding [ under the Industrial 
Vitalization Law] or ... basic funding." Id. This apparent problem has been solved for national universities 
in the legislation that has created the national university corporations. Id. 
47. Forum on University-based Research, European Universities: Enhancing Europe's Research Base 
(European Commission 2005) [hereinafter European Universities], http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/ 
conferences/2004/univ/pdf/enhancing_ europeresearchbase _ en.pdf. 
48. Id. at 11. 
49. The report on European Universities specifically points out scientific centers it calls "trans-
disciplinary" in the United States at universities such as Berkeley, Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, and 
Stanford. Id. at 35. 
50. Id. at 12-15. Interestingly, the report on European Universities, in discussing the role ofuniversities 
in the creation of knowledge, states that universities have an entrepreneurial role "as sources of spin-offs 
and start-up companies .... Addressing this role is tremendously difficult, and is not solved merely by 
encouraging Universities to take out patents." Id. at 24. For more information concerning the policies 
and trends in the management of intellectual property generated at universities and other public research 
organizations, see TuRNING SCIENCE INTO BUSINESS, supra note 38, at 3. 
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more practical problems as opposed to theoretical issues. Interestingly, Germany has 
recently restructured its university system to create centers of excellence somewhat 
modeled after the American university system's "Ivy League." 51 
In addition to changes in the structure of university systems in Europe and Japan 
to resemble some characteristics of U.S. universities, the governments in Europe and 
Japan have been and are continuing to encourage collaboration between universities 
and industry in those countries. In 1984, the European Union established European 
Framework Programmes (FWPs) that were designed to encourage collaboration in 
research and development in several fields between universities, industry, and other 
research institutions across Europe. 52 FWPs are the main mechanism through which 
the European Union distributes research funds and are a major part of the attempt to 
create a European Research Area. 53 The European Research Area is 
a vision for the future ofresearch in Europe, based on an internal market for science 
and technology, which seeks to foster scientific excellence, competitiveness and 
innovation through the promotion of better co-operation and co-ordination between 
all relevant European actors at all levels. The creation of ERA aims to ensure the free 
movement of researchers, ideas and technology in Europe, to overcome the 
fragmentation of European research, and at co-ordinating national and European 
programmes and policies to avoid the duplication ofresources and efforts.54 
According to the authors of a study concerning research joint ventures formed 
pursuant to FWPs between 1983 and 1996, FWPs have been successful in developing 
a closer relationship between universities and industry in Europe. 55 In fact, the authors 
found that, "[u]niversities have been very active, participating in more than fifty 
percent of [research joint ventures] in all but one technology areas, the highest rate 
being in the area of biotechnology (92% ). "56 The impetus for this collaboration by 
industry has included "research synergies, keeping up with major technological 
developments and R&D cost sharing." 57 The most recent FWP, the Seventh 
Framework Programme, is designed to apply between 2007 and 2013 and has a budget 
of53.2 billion euros. 58 Notably, 32.3 billion euros is allocated to "gaining leadership 
in key scientific and technology areas by supporting co-operation between universities, 
industry, research centres and public authorities across the EU and with the rest of the 
world." 59 Another portion of that fund is devoted to increasing the mobility of 
researchers between university and industry.60 
51. Charles P. Wallace, Germany's Ivy League, TIME, March 31, 2002. 
52. Caloghirou et al., supra note 29, at 153-54. 
53. European Commission, Sixth Framework Programme, Frequently Asked Questions 1, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/faq_en.pdf (last visited April 9, 2007). 
54. EurActiv.com, European Research Area-Within Reach?, http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/ 
european-research-area-reach/article-162032 (last visited April 9, 2007). 
55. Caloghirou et al., supra note 29, at 154. 
56. Id. at 159. 
57. Id. at 154. 
58. European Commission, The Seventh Framework Programme 1, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/fp7-brochure _ en.pdf (last visited April 9, 2007). 
59. EurActiv.com, 7th Research Framework Programme, http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/7th-
research-framework-programme-fp7/article-l l 7494. 
60. European Research Area-Within Reach?, supra note 54. 
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The Japanese government began to attempt to increase collaborations between 
universities and industry in the early 1980s by creating collaborative research 
programs, allowing universities to take on research projects using private funds, and 
developing a system of collaborative research centers at national universities. 61 While 
the efforts to increase collaboration did not increase patenting and licensing activity 
between the late 1980s and 1995, there was more collaboration between industry and 
universities during that time period. 62 For example, in 1985, there were 216 
cooperative research and development projects involving 254 researchers; by 1995, 
there were 1704 cooperative research and development projects with 1843 
researchers. 63 The total amount funded in commissioned research and development 
projects increased from 14.7 million dollars in 1985 to 150 million dollars in 1995.64 
There has also been an increase in the number of Cooperative Research Centers from 
three in 1985 to forty-nine in 1995. 65 In addition to those reforms, "the Japanese 
legislature in 1996 enacted the Science and Technology Basic Plan," which called for 
an increase in the amount of government funding for research in an attempt to come 
close to government funding for research in other industrialized countries. 66 The 
Second Science and Technology Basic Plan, enacted in 2001, is directed to increasing 
collaborations between universities, industry, and the government. 67 
Governments in Europe and the Japanese government are also attempting to 
encourage technology transfer and collaborations between industry and universities in 
other ways. For example, in 2001, the Japanese government lifted a ceiling on the 
amount of funds "that researchers at public universities are allowed to earn from 
government-held patents based on their work."68 The ceiling was 50,000 dollars and 
now there is no limit.69 The Japanese government also enacted the University 
Technology Transfer Promotion Law. 70 That law encourages universities to establish 
technology transfer offices directed to transfer technology from universities to 
industry. 71 The Japanese government also passed the Law to Strengthen Industrial 
Technology Capability in 2000, which "allows university professors to consult for 
private enterprises and take managerial positions with companies in which their 
research is used [ and makes] it possible for researchers to gain economic benefits from 
such activities. "72 
61. Steven Collins & Hikoji Wakoh, Universities and Technology Transfer in Japan: Recent Reforms 
in Historical Perspective, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 213, 216-17 (2000). 
62. Id. at 217-18. However, patent applications in Japan by National Universities have risen from 
below 100 in 1995 to over 350 in 1999. See David Cyranoski, Japan's Academics Get Green Light to 
Make Their Fortunes, 410 NATURE 504 (2001). 
63. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 216. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 219. 
67. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 25. 
68. Cyranoski, supra note 62, at 504. 
69. Id. 
70. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 219. 
71. Id. 
72. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 26. 
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In 200 I, the Japanese government initiated the Knowledge Cluster Initiative as 
part of the Second Science and Technology Basic Plan and the Industrial Cluster 
Program. 73 Both programs have as part of their objective the development of regional 
technology systems. 74 The Knowledge Cluster Initiative is tasked with, among other 
things, "conducting joint research among universities, public research institutes and 
companies mainly at universities, [and] patenting and developing research results 
towards commercial use .... "75 The Industrial Cluster Initiative is designed, in part, 
to provide "policy support for forming industry-academic-government networks. "76 
In 2001, the Japanese government "set the goal of doubling the number of university-
based companies to 1,000 in the next three years." 77 In 2004, the government 
announced that the "number had hit 1,000" and the government will spend 480 million 
dollars funding start-ups. 78 However, despite the large numbers of start-ups, those 
start-ups may have difficulty surviving because the Japanese venture capital market 
(1.6 billion) is substantially smaller than the United States (22 billion) or European 
market (13 billion).79 Further, in Europe, at least one country is creating a government 
fund similar to a private venture capital fund to provide funding for commercialization 
that is apparently beyond funding for invention. 80 
Not only are governments attempting to encourage industry and university 
collaboration in Europe and Japan, but some universities are actively engaging in 
technology transfer and establishing contacts with industry and, importantly either 
taking an active role in early stage financing or engaging venture capital funds. For 
example, at least one major research institution in the United Kingdom, the Imperial 
College of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Imperial College) has been focused 
on technology transfer for almost twenty years.81 In 1986, Imperial College formed 
Imperial Innovations Group P.L.C., which is a technology transfer company with the 
purpose of evaluating and licensing research results. As of April 20, 2006, "Imperial 
Innovations had equity holdings in 58 spin-out companies and has concluded over 100 
intellectual property agreements arising from the College's research activity." 82 
73. Masayuki Kondo, Regional Innovation Policy and Venturing Clusters in Japan, 14 ASIAN J. TECH. 
INNOVATION 2, 170-72 (2006). 
74. Id. at 171-72. 
15. Id. at 171. 
16. Id. at 172. Kondo notes that there have been some problems with a low level of entrepreneurial 
activity by start-up companies in Japan and recommends the creation of''venture clusters" that "focus[] on 
the functions to create or assist creating start-ups." Id. 
77. Ichiko Fuyuno, Japanese Spin-offs Face Struggle for Survival, 441 NATURE 280 (2006). 
78. Id. 
19. Id. 
80. See Stevens & Fraser, supra note 42, at 37. 
81. See Imperial College, London, Imperial Innovations History, http://www. 
imperialinnovations.co.uk/index.php?option=com _ content&task=view&id =30&grp=4&1temid=4 i (last 
visited April 9, 2007); see also P. O'Brien, William A. Wakeham & J.T. Walsh, University-Industry 
Strategic Alliance: A British Perspective, in RESEARCH TEAMS AND PARTNERSHIPS: TRENDS IN THE 
CHEMICAL SCIENCES, REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 32 (1999), available al http://books.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record _ id=97 59&page=28 ( discussing function of Imperial Innovations). 
82. See Imperial College, London, Technology Transfer Company Established by Imperial College 
London lo Float on the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange (2006), 
http://www.imperial.ac.uk/P7996.htm. 
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Interestingly, in July of 2006, Imperial Innovations raised 26 million pounds through 
offering shares on the London Stock Exchange, the first IPO of a "majority owned 
university technology transfer company in the UK." 83 Those funds will be used for 
continued investment in spin-off companies and technology transfer. 84 Imperial 
College also started IC Consultants in 1990, a consulting company consisting of 
academic staff that "markets the use of the college's scientific research facilities for use 
by industrial partners .... "85 Imperial College also makes use of strategic alliances 
with industrial partners. 86 The strategic alliance includes a long term relationship 
between the university and an industrial partner.87 An example includes the research 
center completely funded by Srnithkline Beecham and Zeneca. 88 Another example of 
a university with a well-developed plan to commercialize university research is the 
University of Manchester. The University of Manchester built a biotechnology 
incubator building in 1999 that leases space to spin-off companies and has created a 
wholly owned subsidiary to manage that space, called The University of Manchester 
Incubator Company Limited. 89 The University of Manchester has also formed the 
University ofManchester Intellectual Property Limited to direct the commercialization 
of intellectual property managed and/or created by the university 90 and the Manchester 
Technology Fund which provides early stage equity funding for new spin-off 
companies. 91 
In Japan, Tokyo University researchers funded the Advanced Science and 
Technology Enterprise Corporation in 2001, which is an early-stage venture capital 
fund.92 Hokkaido University has also developed a hybrid technology transfer and 
venture capital fund business that is designed to aid and form businesses built around 
the results of university research. 93 Interestingly, in a 2001 study, 59.3 percent of241 
researchers in Hokkaido responded to a questionnaire indicating that they were 
interested in starting up a company. 94 Tsukuba University has also formed the Tsukuba 
Advanced Research Alliance that is tasked with managing patents and licensing and 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Imperial College, London, Imperial College Consultants: About Us, http://www.imperial-
consultants.co.uk/page.php?id=2 (last visited April 9, 2007); O'Brien et al., supra note 81, at 32. 
86. O'Brien et al., supra note 81, at 33. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. University of Manchester Incubator Company, Manchester Incubator Building, 
http://www.umic.co.uk/manchester _technology_ quarter/Manchester_ Incubator_ Building.php (last visited 
April 9, 2007). 
90. University of Manchester, University of Manchester Intellectual Property Limited: About Us, 
http://www.umip.com/about (last visited April 9, 2007). 
91. Manchester Technology Fund, Manchester Technology Fund, http://www.mantechfund.com (last 
visited April 9, 2007). 
92. See Cyranoski, supra note 62, at 504; ASTEC, About ASTEC, http://www.ut-astec.com/ 
en_ about.html (last visited April 9, 2007). 
93. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 220. 
94. Kondo, supra note 73, at 176. Notably, Kondo states that "new start-ups including university start-
ups are supported mentally by local communities [because] Hokkaido is the land of frontier spirit and 
openness to newcomers" and the author compares it to California. Id. at 178. 
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will "stay with funded companies until they go public."95 Since 1992, the largest 
number of spin-off companies from universities in Japan have been life sciences 
companies.96 
As discussed above, the differences in the structures of the European and Japanese 
university systems, among other factors, 97 make it unclear whether legislation similar 
to the Bayh-Dole Act would have an impact like that in the United States-increased 
patenting and licensing and other economic impact-in other developed countries that 
adopt similar provisions. However, some developed countries in Europe and Japan 
appear to be very focused on encouraging technology transfer and the economic 
benefits that apparently flow from the transfer of technology from universities to 
industry. The success of those countries in achieving the supposed benefits of the 
Bayh-Dole Act remains to be seen.98 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANTICOMMONS IN THE UNITED ST A TES 
The tragedy of the anti commons theory asserts that if multiple patent rights are 
granted in a potential commercial application then those rights may block one another 
and then no one will have an effective right to use the commercial application or 
property.99 Parties may transfer rights to overcome the anticommons, but they might 
be unable to ifthere are transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases that 
impede transfer. 100 This theory has been applied to biotechnology innovation and 
usually explains a problem where there are fragmented rights that need to be 
aggregated in order to use a particular commercial application. 101 
95. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 220. 
96. Kondo, supra note 73, at 175. 
97. The existence of venture capital and its availability at early stages in the development ofa start-up 
company in the biotechnology field is likely an important part of the success of the biotechnology industry 
in the United States. See Brigitte Haar, Venture Capital Funding/or Biotechnological Companies in an 
Integrated Financial Services Market: Regulatory Diversity within the E.C., 2 EUR. Bus. ORO. L. 585,587 
(2001 ). As previously discussed, some universities and funds exist in Europe, but according to a CEO of 
a biopharmaceutical company, 
Id. 
the availability of venture capital, combined with the willingness of Wall Street to support 
companies with initial public offerings ... has put the United States as much as five to ten 
years ahead of Europe and Japan in developing a biotechnology industry. Either venture 
capital was not available in those areas, or the ability to cash out as a venture capitalist into 
a public market was much more difficult. 
98. How to avoid the potential negative impacts oflegislation similar the Bayh-Dole Act in OECD and 
developing countries will be discussed in another article. 
99. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); but see Richard A Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There 
a Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION, Summer 2004 (criticizing the anticommons theory as applied 
to biotechnology innovation). 
100. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 698. 
101. Id. at 698; but see David E. Adelman, The Irrationality o/Speculative Gene Patents, in ADVANCES 
IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 123 (Gary D. Libecap ed., JAi Press 2005) ("Once the 
premise of a finite, congested commons is abandoned, the potential for patent anti commons to emerge 
largely disappears and patents on most research tools pose far less of a threat than the typical public 
commons model predicts."); David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotechnology Patent 
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A related potential problem in biotechnology innovation and patenting involves 
the granting of a patent on an upstream biotechnology finding that may be a 
fundamental advance in the field and needed to conduct further research and 
development for multiple purposes. 102 This particular finding may be required by many 
researchers advancing different research agendas to continue their research, but may 
also be needed for development along with other patented research tools to create a 
particular commercial application. Evidence of the latter problem, an anticommons 
resulting from the need to aggregate multiple rights to develop a single commercial 
application, is conflicted. 103 
There are numerous conflicting studies on whether an anticommons exists. 104 For 
example, one particular influential study found that, "[n]one of [the] random sample 
of academics had stopped a project due to the existence of third party patents on 
research inputs" 105 while the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
found that 35 percent of biotechnology researchers experienced difficulties obtaining 
patented inventions necessary for their research. 106 Two recent studies also found a 
statistically significant anticommons effect. 107 
The adoption oflegislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act in OECD countries along 
with changes in university structures may lead to increased patenting and licensing by 
universities in OECD countries, 108 including the securing by those universities and 
spin-off companies of patent rights in the United States. This may contribute to the 
development of a biotechnology anticommons and stifle biotechnology innovation in 
Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 1020-30 (2005) (arguing that "the standard finite commons model 
is not representative of the essentially unbounded opportunities that exist at this early stage of 
development"). 
102. See generally JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL 
TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (2005), 
http://tigger.uic.edu/-jwalsh/NASReport.html. 
103. See Charles McManis & Sucheol Noh, Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and 
Development: The Empirical Evidence to Date (manuscript on file with author). 
104. See, e.g., NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
WORKING ROUP ON REsEARCH TOOLS (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/; NA T'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PuBLIC HEALTH (National Research Council 2006) [hereinafter REAPING THE 
BENEFITS]; AMERICAN Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE 
AAAS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 7 (2006), http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/ AAAS _IP_ Survey_ Report. pdf 
[hereinafter AAAS REPORT]; Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder 
the Free Flow a/Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 6 (2005), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1465; Bhaven N. Sampat, Genomic Patenting by Academic Researchers: 
Bad/or Science? 5-6 (2004), http://mgt.gatech.edu/news_roorn/news/2004/reer/files/sarnpat.pdf; John P. 
Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patenting and Licensing on 
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED CONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., National Research Council 2002); WALSH ET AL., supra note I 02, at 2. 
105. WALSH ET AL., supra note 102, at 2. 
106. AAAS REPORT, supra note 104, at 2. 
107. Murray & Stern, supra note 104, at 5; Sampat, supra note 104, at 26. 
108. Nishijirna, supra note 42, at 3. ("The transition ofNational University to University Corporation 
implies that results of basic research will suddenly change from public goods to private goods and that the 
anticornmons problem will emerge in the product innovation where basic research and development ofnew 
products are complementary."). 
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the United States. While the causal link between the Bayh-Dole Act and increased 
patenting and licensing in the United States is not certain, the Act very well may have 
contributed to increased patenting and licensing. An additional group of universities 
in OECD countries with the means and ability to secure patent rights in the United 
States along with the creation of additional spin-off companies from those universities 
may very well increase the likelihood of the development of an anti commons in the 
United States. As discussed below, this is particularly troubling because of the lack 
of a robust experimental use exception in the United States. Notably, in 2000, the 
European Union and the United States expenditures for research at university 
laboratories were almost the same. 109 
As discussed above, whether the Bayh-Dole Act will be successful in some OECD 
countries is an open question; however, increased patenting and licensing may result. 
Moreover, the conditions that may contribute to an anticommons, e.g., heterogeneous 
interests, and lack of experience in fast-paced, market-oriented bargaining, may also 
be present in Europe. 110 Indeed, because of the lack of tradition in some countries of 
a close connection between academic institutions and industry, there may be more 
institutional resistance within European and Japanese universities to comply with 
industry requests for delays in publishing materials that may disclose patentable 
inventions. Negotiation over those types of provisions may result in substantial delays 
and disagreements concerning the licensing of university-generated patentable 
inventions, which could then result in a breakdown in the licensing of a particular 
patented invention in Europe or Japan, and in the United States. However, in the 
United States, industry is apparently not aggressively enforcing its patents against 
universities, infringement by researchers is very difficult to detect, and researchers are 
apparently ignoring patents. 111 It is unclear whether industry will continue its inaction 
109. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPE OF KNOWLEDGE 2020: A VISION FOR UNIVERSITY-BASED 
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 10 (2004), http:/ /ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2004/univ/index _ en.htm. 
Interestingly, "there are differences between Europe and the US in terms of output, not so much for the 
overall scientific production but for its impact. While the numbers of papers in peer-reviewed journals 
originating from European laboratories is equivalent to the American production, the latter seems to have 
an advantage when it comes to citation index, a crude measure of novelty and quality of the work." Id. 
110. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 700 (heterogeneous interests of rights holders may contribute 
to anticommons along with high transaction costs because of limited competence in fast-paced, market-
oriented bargaining); see Education: Commission Launches Debate on Future of Inventions, EUROPEAN 
REPORT, Feb. 8, 2003, at 471 ("In a general sense, European universities have less well developed structures 
to manage research results than other research institutions. In addition, university staff are less familiar 
with economic realities and with matters of intellectual property rights."). 
111. Richard J. Bauer, Why Not Try the Experiment and Stop Pointing the Finger: Modern University 
Research Unaffected by a Narrow Experimental Use Exception, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 121, 
135 (2005) ("Yet in practice, industry is not aggressively suing universities for patent infringement despite 
both a university's greater than before vulnerability to patent infringement claims, and academic scientists' 
pervasive and routine disregard for intellectual property rights. In fact, academic research using patented 
research tools has mostly remained unmarred and scientific advancement even seems to be accelerating."); 
Katherine Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. 
L. REV. 81, 85 (2004) ("Madey contradicted a belief widespread in the research community ... that all 
nonprofit research was exempt from infringement liability."); see also Christina Weschler, The Informal 
Experimental Use Exception: University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1536 (2004) (arguing that there exists an informal experimental use exception because it is in the interest 
of the patent holder to allow infringing noncommercial use). 
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against university researchers for patent infringement as universities act more like 
private industry in enforcing their patents. Participants in the biotechnology industry 
continue to dedicate some potentially patentable inventions to the public domain, 
which contributes to reducing the likelihood that an anticommons may develop. 112 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit's recent cabining of the experimental use exception may 
eventually result in university researchers avoiding the use of patented research tools 
or following research agendas in areas in which a proliferation of patents exist. The 
contribution of increased patenting and licensing in the United States by universities 
and spin-off companies in OECD countries may very well contribute to the 
development of an anti commons in the United States. 
V. PRESSURE TO DEVELOP A ROBUST EXPERIMENTAL USE 
EXCEPTION IN THE UNITED ST A TES 
This Article argues that as developed countries adopt legislation similar to the 
Bayh-Dole Act, increased patenting and licensing could result in both Europe and 
Japan, and in the United States. Consequently, the likelihood that a tragedy of the 
anticommons could develop in the United States is increased. This is particularly true 
because of the very narrow common law experimental use exception in the United 
States. Moreover, research and development may be pushed outside of the United 
States where researchers can take advantage of a more robust exception. It is less 
likely that a tragedy of the anticommons would develop in European Union countries 
despite the potential increase of patenting and licensing that could result from 
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act because of the broader experimental use 
exception that exists in those countries. The possible development of a tragedy of the 
anticommons in the United States will likely place pressure on the United States to 
adopt an experimental use exception that resembles the exemption in the European 
Union. 113 One of the benefits of this change is the avoidance of a tragedy of the 
anti commons. 
A potential solution to avoiding or mitigating the negative impact of a tragedy of 
the anticommons in biotechnology innovation is to adopt a robust experimental use 
exception. A robust experimental use exception to patent infringement may allow a 
researcher to engage in some use of the patented invention without having to obtain a 
license, thus avoiding transaction costs associated with obtaining the license and 
mitigating problems with hold-ups associated with a tragedy of the anticommons. 
One potential problem with adoption of a robust experimental use exception to 
patent infringement is the negative effect on incentives to invent and innovate. A 
robust exemption may erode the economic value of a patented product or process and 
thus make it less likely that one would invest in the invention or commercialization of 
that patented product or process. This is particularly troublesome for research tools 
that may be the subject of research and investigation and follow-on research and 
I 12. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2005). 
113. This pressure could also result in changing provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States 
designed to ensure access to government funded inventions, such as the exceptional circumstances 
provision, the march-in provisions, or the adoption of a research exemption similar to that proposed by 
Professor Gary Pulsinelli. See generally Pulsinelli, supra note 4. 
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development, but are also commercial products and processes. 114 Moreover, with 
especially complicated research projects, the patented tool may be just one of many 
tools needed to advance a particular research agenda. In attempting to address issues 
concerning research tools and the experimental use exception, many commentators 
have advocated for changes to the experimental use exception, including expanding its 
coverage. 
There are two experimental use exceptions to patent infringement in the United 
States: the common law experimental use exception and the statutory experimental use 
exception.• 15 This essay will focus on the common law experimental use exception as 
that exception is most likely implicated with university research. 116 The statutory 
experimental use exception is directed to experimentation conducted for the purpose 
ofregulatory review. 117 The common law experimental use exception was designed to 
allow experimentation with a patented invention for the "sole purpose of gratifying a 
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement .... " 118 If the use of the 
114. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an 
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARiz. L. REV. 457,463 (2004). Dreyfuss states: 
The fruits of biotechnology ... blur the core dichotomy between fundamental and end-use 
work. Inventions in this field-genomics and proteomics, for example-have immediate, 
commercial applications as diagnostics or treatments and thus they qualify for patent 
protection. At the same time, they are of crucial importance to researchers, and as such, 
they have enormous power. These "upstream" patents cover not just product markets but 
also innovation markets ... , the ability to carry out fundamental research. 
Id. See also David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 Hous. J. lNT'L 
L. 615,618 (1994) (''The dual role of biotechnological discoveries as research tools and as commercial 
products and processes, raises potentially significant issues related to whether early stage or laboratory scale 
developments ... will receive broad protection or whether they will be made available for others to build 
upon."); cf HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE POST-MADEY RESEARCH EXEMPTION 2 (2003), 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl _ s31 Publications/FileUpload 13 7 /15 88/post-madley"/420whitepaper.pdf ("Use 
of a patented research tool for its intended purpose as a research tool should be carefully understood as not 
coming under an experimental use exemption."). 
115. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 27I(e)(I) (2001); Merck KGAA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 
193 (2005); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
116. A broad interpretation of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Integra Lifesciences 
may result in application of the statutory exemption to research conducted at universities. Moreover, 
university research "reasonably related" to regulatory approval may implicate the statutory exemption. 
117. The statutory experimental use exempts conduct that would be infringing if conducted solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the Food and Drug 
Administration. This exemption is particularly important to the generic pharmaceutical industry, but may 
be less relevant to academic researchers than the common law experimental use exception. Other countries 
have adopted similar statutory exceptions designed to enable generic pharmaceutical companies to use a 
patented invention for purposes related to providing information to regulatory agencies for the marketing 
of pharmaceuticals. For example, Canada has an exception that provides: "(I) Exception. It is not an 
infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under any law of Canada, 
a province or a country other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any 
product." Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P 4, s. 55.2(1) (1985). In Europe, member countries of the European 
Union are required by Directive to introduce legislation adopting an exception for patent infringement for 
use of a patented invention to develop information for regulatory review. See European Union Directive, 
No. 2004/27/EC, Article 10.6. 
118. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F.Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). For a discussion 
of the evolution of the United States experimental use exception, see Strandburg, supra note l l l, at 93-l 00. 
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patented invention was for commercial use or with intent to profit, the use would not 
be exempted from infringement. 119 Apparently most academic researchers believe their 
use of a patented invention during research is exempt from infringement under this 
exception. 120 While academic researchers may continue to believe their conduct is 
exempt, it is clear that much of the use by academic researchers of patented inventions 
is now not exempt from patent infringement. In a recent Federal Circuit case, Madey 
v. Duke University, 121 the court determined that the experimental use exception did not 
apply to research that utilized a patented invention at a university if there is a remote 
commercial purpose, including a purpose consistent with a university's legitimate 
business objectives. 122 The court stated that the university's legitimate business 
objectives included, "educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in 
[noncommercial research projects]." 123 The court strictly limited the application of the 
common law experimental use exception to conduct that which is limited to or "solely 
for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." 124 The 
Madey court further stated that the "profit or nonprofit status of the user is not 
determinative." 125 The National Research Council recently stated that after Madey 
"formal research enjoys no absolute protection from infringement liability regardless 
ofinstitutional venue, the purpose of the inquiry, the origin of the patented inventions, 
or the use that is made ofthem." 126 One scholar has stated that the interpretation of the 
experimental use doctrine is so narrow "that, for all practical purposes, the doctrine has 
become a nullity." 127 Some have argued that the Madey decision will have a chilling 
effect on academic research, particularly in the biotechnology field. 128 
119. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F.Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)(No. 12,391), see also Dreyfuss, supra 
note 114, at 458 ("[T]o early jurists, a clear distinction could be made between using patented material to 
learn about the patented invention and using patented material for business or for commerce - between 
using the patent to satisfy curiosity or using it to tum a profit."). 
120. REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 104, at 92. 
121. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
122. Id. at 1362. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1653. Patent law scholar Harold Wegner has criticized contemporary courts for apparently 
not recognizing that "philosophical" in the Nineteenth century meant "scientific," so philosophical 
experiments were scientific experiments. WEGNER, supra note 114, at 3-4. 
125. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
126. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AP A TENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 I ST CENTURY 7 (Stephen A. Merrill 
et al eds., 2004), available at http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/misc.NAS 
report.pdf .. 
127. Janice M. Mueller, The Evenescent Experimantal Use Exemption from U.S. Patent ln.fringment 
Liability: Implication for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 
918 (2004 ); see also Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 268 (2006) ("The Madey v. Duke University decision ... made it clear that 
effectively no research exemption exists in U.S. law and thereby created a precarious legal situation for U.S. 
universities."). 
128. See MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AN EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION FOR NEW 
ZEALAND'S PATENT LEGISLATION, AN OPTIONS PAPER 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/3 l 657/options-paper.pdf ("This decision is widely regarded as narrowing 
the experimental use exception in the United States to the point where most organizations carrying out 
research or experimental work involving patented inventions could find themselves liable for patent 
infringement.") But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 
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As discussed above, several studies have been conducted to test whether an 
anti commons has developed specifically with Madey in mind. 129 Those studies conflict 
with one another as to whether an anticommons has developed, but warn that the 
Madey decision may contribute to the development of an anticommons as patent 
owners begin to enforce their patent rights against academic researchers. 130 In spite 
of the inconclusive evidence, many have argued for an expanded experimental use 
exception in the United States, including an exception that resembles that of other 
developed countries. 131 In a recent OECD Working Paper entitled "Research Use of 
Patented Knowledge: A Review," the authors caution that, "there is reasonably strong 
evidence suggesting that patents may have some deleterious effects on scientific 
research." 132 However, the authors also caution that there is "insufficient empirical 
data at this stage to demonstrate that any particular form of the exemption will be more 
effective than others in guarding against future restrictions on scientific work. " 133 
Some developed countries have more robust experimental use exceptions than the 
United States. 134 In some countries, an analog to the United States common law 
958 (2003) (No. 02-1007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002-
l 007 .pet.ami.inv.html ("Even assuming the Federal Circuit's decision substantially limits the availability 
of the experimental use defense, there are several reasons why the practical impact of that decision may not 
be as great as petitioner fears .... "). 
129. See generally, WALSH ET AL., supra note 102; REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 104. 
130. REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 104; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE 
INNov A TION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PA TENT LA w AND POLICY 35 (2003 ), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l 0/innovationrpt.pdf; but see AAAS REPORT, supra note I 04; Mowery & 
Sampat, supra note 12; Murray & Stem, supra note 104. 
131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 114, at 471. In this paper, Dreyfuss proposes the following system: 
[A] university or other nonprofit research institution that wants to use patented material and 
cannot obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms could use the technology 
without permission ifit is willing to sign a waiver, [which] would require the institution to 
promptly publish the results of work conducted with the patented technology and to refrain 
from patenting discoveries made in the course of that work. 
Id. See also Andrew Caruso, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's View, 14 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 215 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1017 (1989); Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information 
on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2006); Robert A. Migliorini, The Narrowed 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement and Its Application to Patented Computer Software, 
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523 (2006); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking 
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 
I (2001); Mueller,supranote 127; Parker,supranote 114; Strandburg,supranote 111. Cf JordanP. Karp, 
Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, I 00 YALE L.J. 
2169, 2179-2181 (1991) ("A system with a broad experimental use allowance would have a disparate 
impact on less well-financed inventors whose ability to conduct R&D may be limited in the short term when 
they are not able to convince possible investors of the potential commercial success of their patented 
inventions."); Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination 
of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L. J. 359, 
372-74 (2004); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 954 (2006). 
132. CHRIS DENT, PAUL JENSEN, SOPHIE WALLER, & BETH WEBSTER, 0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., RESEARCH USE OF PATENTED KNOWLEDGE: A REVIEW 45 (2006), 
http:/ /oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=353 l 3 78/cl= 19/nw= I /rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=519pscsjvnvl. pdf. 
133. Id. 
134. See REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note I 04, at 92 ("Many other nations provide somewhat broader 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 280 2007
280 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2 
research exception may be in legislation or in case law.135 Most European Union 
countries have enacted legislation implementing Article 27 of the Community Patent 
Convention. 136 The Community Patent Convention provides that "[t]he rights 
conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to: ... (b) acts done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention. " 137 
This provision delineates between experimenting on a patented invention, which would 
be excused and experimenting with a patented invention, which would not be 
exempted. 138 Thus, the experimental use exception in those countries is not focused 
on whether there is a commercial or nonprofit purpose for the research, but on the 
nature of the research itself. 139 Research that may be permitted by a research 
exemptions [than the United States]."); WEGNER, supra note 114, at 10-11. Wegner explains that 
A liberal trend has been observed to favor a broader experimental use exception abroad. In 
contrast to the American view which is tinged with whether there is a commercial taint, the 
majority view around the world dismisses whether the invention was tested by a commercial 
operation or for commercial purposes and, instead, focuses upon the qualitative question of 
whether the use of the invention was to explore the nature of the invention itself (versus 
using the invention for its intended purpose). 
Id. See also Hagelin, supra note 13 I, at 521 ("Although the scope of ... foreign experimental use 
exemptions varies, they all provide at a minimum for the use of patent subject matter for the purpose of 
determining whether a patented invention is feasible, useful, or technically operable. Some of the foreign 
experimental use exemptions are considerably broader and allow for the use of patent subject matter even 
when the use is clearly commercially motivated."); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE 2 (2005), http://www.acip.gov.au/reviews.htm (follow "Consideration 
of patents and experimental use" hyperlink; then follow "report" hyperlink) [hereinafter PA TENTS AND 
EXPERIMENTAL USE] ("[T]he law on experimental use of patented inventions differs markedly around the 
world, and there is little movement to further rectify this."). 
135. Some countries also have statutory experimental use exceptions similar to the United State 
exception that is directed to uses related to regulatory approval. Other countries have interpreted their non-
statutory experimental use exception to apply to some uses related to regulatory approval. See, Mueller, 
supra note 12 7, at 969- 7 I ( examining statutory experimental use exceptions in other countries); Peter 
Ruess, Accepting Exceptions?: A Comparative Approach to Experimental Use in U.S. and German Patent 
Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 81, 97-101 (2006) (discussing German cases applying statutory 
exemption to clinical trials for regulatory review). 
136. DENT ET AL., supra note 132. Japan adopted a similar experimental use exception. See Mueller, 
supra note 127, at 969- 70. 
137. Agreement Relating to Community Patents art. 27(b), Dec. 15, 1989, 89/695/EEC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?=CELEX: 41989 AO 695(0 I ):EN :HTML [hereinafter Community 
Patent Convention]. See also DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 18 n.44 ("Although the [Community Patent 
Convention] never came into force, it has had an influential role in the development of patent legislation 
in the EU member states. As a result, article 27(b) has been widely implemented into the national patent 
statutes of the EU member states, including those who are also OECD member countries."). 
138. DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 32. See also PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE lsSUES PAPER, 
supra note 26, at 18. This source explains 
[t]he distinction [between experimenting with or on a patented invention] seems consistent 
with the fundamental principles of the patent system in balancing the needs of the primary 
innovator with those of secondary innovators and end-users and is closely related to the 
disclosure requirements. As Eisenberg states "If the public had absolutely no right to use 
the disclosure without the patent holder's consent until after the patent expired, it would 
make little sense to require that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at the 
outset of the patent term." 
Id. (quoting Eisenberg, supra note 131, at 1022). 
139. WEGNER,supra note 114, at 12. See also PATENTSANDEXPERIMENTALUSElSSUESPAPER,supra 
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exemption would include use of the patented invention to improve, study, or design 
around the patented invention. 140 The distinction between experimenting on and with 
a patented invention does not work well with research tools. Experimentation with a 
research tool uses the tool for its intended purpose-to conduct research. Allowing 
experimentation with a research tool without liability would eviscerate the economic 
incentive to invent those tools. Commentators have made some proposals to 
specifically address research tools and those proposals should be seriously considered 
because of the potential for patents on research tools to hinder follow-on research and 
development. 141 
Moreover, there are some difficulties associated with distinguishing between 
experimentation on and with an invention and the "language may provide false comfort 
to researchers, as it will ultimate[ly] be interpreted by legal experts, not 
technologists. " 142 Some of the advantages of a statutory experimental use exception 
include improved clarity and thus, increased efficiency, and the "encourage[ment of] 
further secondary innovation by non-patent holders." 143 Another advantage includes 
encouraging peer review of the patented technology. 144 Some potential general 
problems with a statutory experimental use exception include a decrease in value of 
patents and the belief that exemptions are limited to those described in the statute. 
Thus "appropriate drafting would be crucial." 145 
The existence of robust experimental use exceptions may decrease the chance for 
the development of an anticommons in Europe and Japan. However, in countries 
without a robust experimental use exception, such as the United States, it is more likely 
note 26, at 18. The author states that 
Id. 
[I]n contrast to the ·recent views of the American courts (as expressed in Madey) which are 
influenced by whether there is a 'commercial taint', the majority view around the world 
ignores whether the invention was tested by a commercial operation or for non-commercial 
purposes and, instead, focuses upon the qualitative question of whether the use of the 
invention was to explore the nature of the invention itself versus using the invention for its 
intended purpose. Thus the modem trend particularly in Europe is to draw a distinction 
based on whether the experimentation is on the invention itself-to determine how it 
operates, test it, and use it as a base to make different, improvement inventions-as opposed 
to using an invention/or its intended purposes. 
140. Strandburg, supra note 111, at I 00. 
141. See generally, Dreyfuss, supra note 114; Strandburg, supra note 111. 
142. DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 34; see also Strandburg, supra note 111, at 148-52 ("[I]t is 
probably impossible to produce a bright-line rule to distinguish between the two types of 
experimentation."). 
143. DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 33. See also PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 134, 
at 2. This source explains: 
Id. 
Under US case law experimental acts are only permitted if they are not in furtherance of the 
alleged infringer's legitimate business. This approach has been highly controversial and is 
considered by the [Advisory Council] as one best avoided because it does not appear to 
follow the principles of the patent system. There is at least some degree of harmony within 
Europe, where most countries have a statutory exemption that is worded very like the 
following: The rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to acts done for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention. 
144. Dreyfuss, supra note 114, at 470. 
145. DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 33-34. 
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that an increased number of patents and licensing as a result of the adoption of 
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act by other OECD countries may result in the 
development of a tragedy of the anticommons. 146 Moreover, even ifOECD countries 
adopt research exemptions in their versions of the Bayh-Dole Act or broader so-called 
"march-in rights" than the U.S. version or interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
benefits of those provisions may be unavailable to U.S. academic and industry 
researchers. Second, the lack of a robust experimental use exception may also lead to 
research and development work to be outsourced to countries with a robust 
experimental use exception. 147 Consequently, the United States may be pressured to 
adopt a more robust experimental use exception similar to other countries or as 
proposed by commentators. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act will result in increased patenting 
and licensing in the near future in Europe and Japan is unclear; however, changes made 
by countries in Europe and in Japan in university structure make it much more likely 
that the Bayh-Dole Act may cause increased patenting and licensing, including that 
activity in the United States. The pressure from increased patenting and licensing in 
the United States by universities and spin-off companies in Europe and Japan may 
result in the United States adopting a more robust common law experimental use 
exception to avoid a potential tragedy of the anticommons.' 48 
146. The existence of an experimental use exception that distinguishes between researching on and with 
a patented invention will not allow the access necessary to avoid an anticommons in every situation. For 
example, experimentation with research tools may be an infringement. A broader research exemption 
perhaps modeled after Professor Strandburg' s proposal or Professor Dreyfuss' s proposal may alleviate some 
of the concerns associated with research tools. See generally Strandburg, supra note 111; Dreyfuss, supra 
note 114. The existence of a broad research exemption may negatively impact the ability of some start-up 
biotechnology companies to obtain venture capital. See Mireles, supra note 23, at 1209-10. 
147. See Migliorini, supra note 131, at 542 (arguing that the United States may lose parts of software 
industry to foreign markets with robust experimental use exception); Mueller, supra note 127, at 919 
("Without [a broader exemption], scientific research functions that require use of patented inventions are 
more likely to be shifted offshore to legally hospitable forums."); see also Hagelin, supra note 131, at 522 
(Research exemptions in other countries that are broader than the U.S. exemption "could result in the 
migration of top researchers from the United States to other countries and deprive industry, as well as 
universities, of critical human resources."). 
148. Another option may include adopting a research exemption available for recipients of government 
funding for use of government funded research results similar to the one proposed by Professor Pulsinelli. 
See generally Pulsinelli, supra note 4. 
